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Abstract
Background
Tobacco industry interference has been identified as the greatest obstacle to the implemen-
tation of evidence-based measures to reduce tobacco use. Understanding and addressing
industry interference in public health policy-making is therefore crucial. Existing conceptua-
lisations of corporate political activity (CPA) are embedded in a business perspective and
do not attend to CPA’s social and public health costs; most have not drawn on the unique
resource represented by internal tobacco industry documents. Building on this literature,
including systematic reviews, we develop a critically informed conceptual model of tobacco
industry political activity.
Methods and Findings
We thematically analysed published papers included in two systematic reviews examining
tobacco industry influence on taxation and marketing of tobacco; we included 45 of 46
papers in the former category and 20 of 48 papers in the latter (n = 65). We used a grounded
theory approach to build taxonomies of “discursive” (argument-based) and “instrumental”
(action-based) industry strategies and from these devised the Policy Dystopia Model, which
shows that the industry, working through different constituencies, constructs a metanarra-
tive to argue that proposed policies will lead to a dysfunctional future of policy failure and
widely dispersed adverse social and economic consequences. Simultaneously, it uses
diverse, interlocking insider and outsider instrumental strategies to disseminate this narra-
tive and enhance its persuasiveness in order to secure its preferred policy outcomes. Limi-
tations are that many papers were historical (some dating back to the 1970s) and focused
on high-income regions.
Conclusions
The model provides an evidence-based, accessible way of understanding diverse corpo-
rate political strategies. It should enable public health actors and officials to preempt these
strategies and develop realistic assessments of the industry’s claims.
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Author Summary
WhyWas This Study Done?
• Interference by the tobacco industry in government policy-making is known to be an
important reason for governments’ failure to adopt proven measures to reduce tobacco
consumption.
• Our study aimed to systematically review tobacco industry political activity from a criti-
cal societal perspective using in-depth empirical evidence.
• We set out to build a widely applicable model that governments in different countries
could use to identify and preempt industry interference in policy.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find?
• We analysed 65 papers included in previous systematic reviews that examined tobacco
industry political activity in two policy areas: taxation and marketing of tobacco
products.
• Using constructivist grounded theory, we identified industry arguments and techniques
and then grouped these under the more general heading of strategies, finally developing
a taxonomy and model of tobacco industry political activity.
• According to our Policy Dystopia Model, the industry produces an alarmist narrative
that proposed policies will fail and lead to a great number of undesirable social and eco-
nomic consequences (outlined in our taxonomy of discursive strategies).
• The industry also uses different methods (outlined in our taxonomy of instrumental
strategies) to disseminate this narrative and persuade decision-makers in order to block
policies.
What Do These Findings Mean?
• Public health actors and policy-makers can use our model and taxonomies to better pro-
mote tobacco-related policies and to render ineffective tobacco industry opposition and
political activity.
• In particular, they need to pay attention to alliance formation, information provision,
interdisciplinary working, and transparency in policy-making.
Introduction
Globally, tobacco kills 6 million people annually, potentially rising to 8 million by 2030 [1]. Of
the 193 member states of the United Nations, 180 have now ratified the Framework Conven-
tion on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which outlines the evidence-based policies required to
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reduce tobacco use. The Convention has driven policy implementation internationally [2], but
progress remains slow [3], with parties to the treaty identifying industry interference as the
greatest impediment to progress [4]. It is increasingly recognised, therefore, that understand-
ing, exposing, and addressing tobacco industry interference is key to progressing tobacco con-
trol [4,5]. The archive of more than 14 million internal tobacco industry documents disclosed
as a result of litigation in the United States [6,7] has generated a unique evidence base for
understanding the conduct of transnational tobacco companies (TTCs). However, given that
there are now over 800 research publications based on these documents [8], evidence syntheses
and conceptual models are required to more effectively use this evidence base to inform policy
and augment social scientific understanding of TTC efforts to influence policy.
To date, only three systematic reviews—on TTC efforts to influence taxation [9], marketing
[10], and policies in lower- and middle-income countries [11]—and two conceptual frame-
works of tobacco industry political activity have been published [10,12]. In the latter category,
only one was based on industry documents and used a systematic review of studies on market-
ing policy to begin to develop a taxonomy of tobacco industry political activity [10], drawing
on Hillman and Hitt’s widely cited taxonomy of corporate political activity [13]. This work
highlighted major shortcomings in Hillman and Hitt’s exchange-theory–based representation
of corporate political activity as a mutually beneficial process through which corporate involve-
ment in policy-making enables governments to develop optimal public policies.
Our current research builds on this initial work by incorporating evidence on the tobacco
industry’s attempts to influence two key policy areas, taxation and marketing, and by taking a
critical approach in order to develop a more comprehensive and grounded understanding of
tobacco industry political activity. Our research questions were: What does the tobacco indus-
try aim to achieve through its political activity? What would a critical taxonomy of tobacco
industry political activity look like? By answering these questions, we also aimed to explore the
value and limitations of Hillman and Hitt’s taxonomy in the context of the tobacco industry.
We conducted in-depth interpretive analysis of papers included in two systematic reviews of
tobacco industry political activity using grounded theory methods. Our analysis led to the
development of two critical taxonomies that we hope will be of use to policy-makers and public
health groups and an overall model that we present as an alternative conceptualisation of cor-
porate political activity.
Methods
Our data comprised the papers included in two systematic reviews that we had previously con-
ducted on tobacco industry political activity, taxation [9], and marketing policies [10]. We
based our analysis on these two systematic reviews, the methodological details of which are
published elsewhere [9,10], because they provide the best quality of evidence in the area of
inquiry. The two reviews used comprehensive searches (database searches, hand searches,
internet searches, expert contact) to identify all relevant academic and grey literature, yielding
2,678 taxation and 1,754 marketing sources. Relevance and quality criteria were applied to
identify the best quality evidence in the field; 46 and 48 papers were included, respectively. The
database for the current analysis comprised 65 papers (Table 1). For taxation, we used all but
one of 46 papers in the original review (we excluded the interim version of a report). For mar-
keting, because this literature had only recently been reviewed by two of the same authors to
develop a taxonomy [10], we selected half (24 of 48) of the papers in the review, using the fol-
lowing criteria: papers covering the last ten years (2003–2013) of the original review period
and an even representation (within the constraints of the original sample) of geographic loca-
tion and specific marketing policies. Four of the 24 were also in the taxation systematic review
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(with different sections analysed for each topic), making a total of 20 marketing papers. The
included papers are listed in S1 Table (taxation) and S2 Table (marketing).
Our approach to analysis was critical; drawing on the findings of our previous systematic
review [10], we rejected Hillman and Hitt’s assumption that corporate political activity is a
transparent and cooperative endeavour based on mutuality and honesty between public and
private actors. We used Sarah Pralle’s concepts of expansion and containment of issues, actors,
and spaces in advocacy work [14]. We also added the extra dimension of “voice” because we
found that diverse voices were instrumental in framing, expanding, and containing issues and
arguments. Additionally, we delineated stylistic features of tobacco industry political activity.
We used the techniques of constructivist grounded theory [15,16]: conceptual coding, sys-
tematic conceptual comparison, discourse sensitivity, attention to divergent data, and concep-
tual explanatory conclusions. Starting with the taxation literature, all the papers were entered
into the ATLAS ti software and SU microcoded them for the smallest meaningful conceptual
idea either as “argument” or “technique”; these were subsequently grouped under discursive
and instrumental strategies, respectively. During this initial microcoding, we did not follow the
coding schema of the two systematic reviews but conducted inductive and emergent coding,
although it quickly became clear that most of the three strategies identified in Hillman and Hitt
[12] and the three additional ones in Savell et al. [10] as well as the frames and arguments in
the latter were relevant. However, we identified many new strategies and conceptually revised
and refined others.
We included in the analysis all strategies identified in the dataset regardless of frequency but
recorded the number of instances each was used (shown in our results tables). When the cod-
ing of the taxation papers was completed, a draft taxonomy was developed. Next, we induc-
tively coded the marketing papers, regularly comparing the emergent coding frame with the
draft taxonomy developed from the taxation papers and revising the latter as necessary. When
all microcoding was completed, the taxonomy was reexamined for conceptual coherence and
clarity and further modified. Next, a dynamic model was developed that accounted for not
only the categories in the taxonomy but the relationships between them and the directions of
influence. The study team (SU, GJF, ABG) met regularly (every 4–6 wk) throughout the study
period to discuss microcodes, taxonomy categories, and the model, discussing and reaching
consensus on divergent views.
Table 1. The number of papers from the two systematic reviews included in the analysis by geo-
graphic location and topic.
Geographic location Taxation* (total in systematic
review: 46)
Marketing* (total in systematic
review: 48)
N America/ Europe/Australasia 39 10
S America - 3
Asia 5 4
Africa 1 -
Transnational - 4
Total 45 20
Marketing and taxation duplicate
papers
4
Total** for taxonomy 65
* Time period covered in systematic review—taxation: 1985–2010; marketing: 2003–2013.
** Total number of papers reaches only 65 rather than 69 because 4 papers featured in both the taxation and
marketing systematic reviews, although different sections were analysed for the two topics.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002125.t001
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Results
The Tobacco Industry’s Policy Aims
Our data showed that, faced with policy proposals aimed at reducing tobacco consumption,
the tobacco industry attempts to secure a range of preferred outcomes that eliminate or limit
the likely impact on its business (Table 2). Defeat—scrapping or shelving the policy—is the
optimal outcome. Delay and weakening are sought if defeat is not possible. Foreclosing the leg-
islative space is a future-facing strategy designed to make subsequent initiation and enactment
of tobacco regulation more difficult. Once policy or regulation is in place, the industry may
seek to overturn it. Alternatively, it attempts regulatory/policy avoidance through noncompli-
ance, circumventing the rules or, for earmarked taxes, diverting earmarked funds.
Table 2. Tobacco industry preferred outcomes for tobacco control policies with examples.
Defeat
In Uzbekistan, British American Tobacco (BAT) succeeded in replacing planned tobacco control legislation
with a voluntary advertising code (1994) [17].
A US state bill to raise cigarette tax, initially supported by the leadership of both the House and the Senate,
was passed with a majority vote in the former but defeated in the latter after intense lobbying by the tobacco
industry (1985) [18].
Delay
A proposed tax increase was blocked in a US state senate for almost a whole legislative session (1981) [19].
TTCs delayed the introduction of large pack health warnings in Canada by 11 months by invoking
international trade agreements (1993) [20].
Weakening
Malaysia’s ﬁrst comprehensive tobacco control legislation was watered down as a result of industry lobbying
(1994) [21].
In Arizona, US, tobacco use prevention programmes were limited to narrow groups (e.g., young people,
pregnant women), reducing their reach and effectiveness (1995) [22].
In Florida and Oregon, US, crippling amendments reduced the effectiveness of clean indoor air legislation
and tobacco tax rises, respectively (1990; 1997) [23].
The industry voluntarily adopted weak European Economic Community health warnings to avoid stronger
ones in Australia (1992) [24].
Foreclosing
Preemption: this was used in the US to restrict the legal authority of lower-level local jurisdictions to pass
strong tobacco control laws once a bill was passed in the higher state legislature (1980s through 1990s)
[25].
Agreement: a South Carolina, US, policy organisation in alliance with the tobacco industry secured pledges
from legislators and public health groups not to seek tax rises or tobacco control policies (1993–1994) [26].
Infrastructural interference: Philip Morris sought to change state laws in Colorado, US, to make ballot
initiation (for tobacco control bills) by the public more difﬁcult (1994) [27].
Self-regulation: the industry sought voluntary marketing codes and youth education programmes to thwart
effective regulation in many countries (1992–2005) [28].
Overturning
The tobacco industry worked for the passage of legislation to overturn previously enacted tobacco control
legislation including tobacco-related Medicaid legislation in Florida 1999 [29].
In Lebanon, a decree banning advertisement was suspended after Philip Morris lobbied ministers (1980)
[30].
Avoidance
Noncompliance: when entering the Czechoslovakia market, Philip Morris ignored preexisting advertising
bans and placed large advertisements in public spaces (1993) [31].
Circumvention: when advertising was banned in Malaysia, TTCs set up companies for nontobacco products
(e.g., fashion, music) in order to advertise indirectly using brand slogans and colours (1982) [21].
In Colorado, US, the industry lobbied the legislature to divert earmarked tax funds away from effective
tobacco control policies to education and nursing services (2003) [27].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002125.t002
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Tobacco Industry Political Activity
Early on in our analysis, we recognised that industry political activity was performed through
both arguments and actions and that these should be conceptualised as synergistic components
of a dynamic model of political influence. We therefore distinguish between discursive (argu-
ment-based) and instrumental (action-based) strategies. We use the term “argument” as a sub-
category of discursive strategies and the more neutral term “technique” instead of the often-
used “tactic” as a subcategory of instrumental strategies. This terminology builds on that in our
previous work [10]. We now present our taxonomies for each.
Taxonomy of Discursive Strategies
The industry’s overall discursive strategy is to exaggerate—expand by argument—potential
costs of proposed policy while simultaneously dismissing—containing by argument—potential
benefits or denying these altogether. It seeks to build a comprehensive and credible narrative of
undesirability for the policy by generating tailored arguments covering many different social
domains (Table 3). Collectively, these mutually reinforcing arguments build the impression
that the proposed public health policy will be detrimental to public health, the economy, and
society. A key feature of this narrative is that it spans diverse sociopolitical domains and com-
munities and is articulated not only by tobacco companies but also through a plurality of third-
party voices, including those of law enforcer, concerned citizen, and public health policy ana-
lyst (Table 3). In this way, opposition to public health policies is represented not as the self-
interested response of a profit-oriented business but the genuine concerns of different sectors
of the public. A 1989 Philip Morris document explains:
“. . . we will need to talk in a variety of voices if what we want to say is to be heard, under-
stood and acted upon. At times, we will speak as Philip Morris; sometimes we will need to
speak as independent scientists, scientific groups and businessmen; and, finally, we will
need to speak as the smoker.”
(Philip Morris document entitled “The ETS Battle” [32])
Expanding and creating potential costs. The industry seeks to exaggerate [9,67–70] the
costs of proposed policies using three related sets of arguments (Table 3). First, it expands the types
and reach of unanticipated costs to the economy and society and creates new costs relating to the
economy, law enforcement, the law, politics and governance, and social justice. The breadth of
arguments is wide-ranging. Key arguments include that public health policies will reduce sales and
jobs in nontobacco sectors and that falling tobacco sales and increasing use of illicit tobacco will
reduce tax revenues (economy). That tobacco control policies will increase illicit trade (law enforce-
ment) is a well-used TTC argument. TTCs often claim that proposed policies are inconsistent with
domestic or international trade and investment law, or that public bodies introducing them are
committing procedural irregularities or acting beyond their legal remit, all of which will lead to
expensive litigation (law). Tobacco control policies are projected as examples of bad governance
and unjustifiable government interference in the market, incompatible with the organising philoso-
phy of liberal democratic states (politics and governance), and smokers are represented as a “pun-
ished”minority whose civil rights are threatened (social justice). In this way and through early
framing [64], the industry attempts to shift the debate away from the health effects of tobacco.
Second, it argues that unintended benefits will fall on undeserving groups (effectively a pol-
icy cost). For example, criminals will benefit from higher tobacco taxes, leading to increased
illicit sales, or earmarked (hypothecated) tobacco taxes will result in undeserved extra income
A Policy Dystopia Model of Political Activity
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for already wealthy doctors, hospitals, and insurance companies. In these discourses, often
delivered through third parties, big tobacco dissociates itself from big health care/big insurance
and aligns itself instead with ordinary citizens.
Third, the industry argues that, far from introducing benefits, the policy will have unin-
tended public health costs and contribute to increased smoking through a number of mediating
psychosocial, behavioural, and economic mechanisms: more prominent pack health warnings
will lead to “warning overload” so smokers will ignore them entirely; warnings and plain pack-
aging will render cigarettes “forbidden fruit” and increase their attractiveness, especially to
young people; plain packaging and increased illicit trade will force companies to compete on
price, pushing prices down.
Containing and denying benefits. In addition, the industry seeks to contain or deny both
the projected public health benefits of the policy and the costs to itself using a mutually
Table 3. Taxonomy of discursive strategies and arguments used to construct policy dystopia.
Discursive
strategy
Domain Argument Voice Instance in dataset
Expanded/Created
Unanticipated
costs to
economy and
society
The economy Policy will lead to lost sales/
jobs
Economist [18], [24], [26], [30], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38]
Policy will lead to lost/
unreliable tax revenue
Economist [18], [25], [26], [33], [36], [39], [40], [41], [42], [43], [44]
Law
enforcement
Policy will increase illicit trade Law enforcer [18], [20], [26], [27], [33], [35], [39], [40], [42], [45], [46],
[47], [48], [49]
Policy will criminalise the public Criminologist [20], [35], [38], [50]
The law Breach of intellectual property
laws
Corporate lawyer [17], [20], [21], [24], [51], [52]
Breach of trade agreements Trade lawyer [24], [38], [43]
Public body acting beyond
jurisdiction
Administrative lawyer [20], [24], [40], [53]
Politics/
Governance
Government is anti-free-
enterprise
Concerned citizen/
Business owner
[17], [18], [20], [21], [24], [25], [28], [30], [38], [40], [43],
[50], [51], [52]
Nanny state/slippery slope Concerned citizen [24], [26], [27], [28], [31], [36], [38], [39], [41], [52], [54]
Government is unreasonable/
unaccountable
Concerned citizen/
Public ethicist
[18], [21], [22], [24], [26], [27], [28], [34], [35], [36], [37],
[39], [41], [51], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56], [57], [58]
Social justice Policy is unfair to smokers Public ethicist [18], [19], [26], [27], [35], [36], [38], [40], [41], [42], [55],
[57], [58], [59]
Policy is regressive Social reformer [18], [19], [25], [33], [34], [35], [36], [39], [41], [54], [59],
[60], [61], [62], [63]
Unintended beneﬁts to
undeserving groups
Smugglers will proﬁt Concerned citizen/
Public ethicist
[27], [40], [45]
Big business will proﬁt Concerned citizen/
Public ethicist
[22], [41], [53], [55], [56], [64]
Unintended costs to public
health
Policy will be counterproductive Public health policy
analyst
[20], [24], [25], [35], [36], [37], [38], [49], [51]
Contained/Denied
Intended public
health beneﬁts
There is not (good) enough evidence Scientist [24], [37], [38], [51], [52], [65]
Policy will not work Public health policy
analyst
[17], [21], [24], [28], [37], [38], [49], [62]
Policy is not needed Public health policy
analyst
[17], [21], [24], [38], [66]
Expected
tobacco
industry costs
Policy will lead to reduced sales/jobs Business owner [17], [18], [19], [20], [25], [39], [42]
Cost of compliance will be high Business owner [24], [37], [50]
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002125.t003
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reinforcing, interdependent set of arguments. While adverse impacts on other (more deserv-
ing) groups such as retailers, farmers, and advertisers are expanded, those on the tobacco
industry are deemphasized. When such impacts are mentioned, they are presented not as a
matter of private loss (of profits) to TTCs but public loss to the whole economy and society. In
denying the public health benefits of policies, TTCs argue that the scientific evidence is incon-
clusive, for example because it relates to predicted—not actual—behaviour, that the policy will
not work, or that it is simply not needed because, for example, the industry fulfils correspond-
ing requirements through voluntary codes.
Absent benefits. Finally, wholly absent from the industry’s narrative are the wider benefits
to the economy and society that commonly result from improvements in public health [71,72].
Taxonomies of Instrumental Strategies
The industry uses both insider (legislative and governmental) and outsider (public domain)
strategies [73,74] in order to persuade the public and decision-makers of the plausibility of its
Table 4. Taxonomy of instrumental strategies and techniques used.
Instrumental strategy Technique Instance in dataset
Coalition management Constituency
recruitment
Internal (tobacco
companies and their
staff)
[18], [20], [21], [23], [24], [25], [28], [33], [34], [37], [39], [40], [46],
[51], [76], [77]
External [18], [19], [20], [21], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [35],
[36], [37], [41], [43], [44], [45], [49], [52], [58], [61], [62], [63], [65],
[76], [77], [78], [79], [80], [81]
Constituency fabrication [18], [19], [24], [25], [26], [27], [31], [33], [35], [36], [40], [53], [55],
[61], [62], [63], [71], [79], [82], [83]
Constituency fragmentation [18], [27], [37], [55], [56], [59], [77], [79], [80]
Information
management
Production Producing a skewed evidence base as
corroboration for projected policy failure
[18], [19], [20], [21], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [30], [31], [33], [35],
[37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [43], [44], [45], [46], [47], [49], [52], [59],
[61], [62], [63], [64], [77], [79], [83]
Intelligence gathering [18], [19], [20], [21], [24], [26], [27], [35], [36], [37], [45], [52], [58],
[64], [65], [70]
Ampliﬁcation Wide dissemination of industry-sponsored
information/evidence
[18], [20], [24], [25], [26], [27], [33], [34], [35], [36], [40], [41], [42],
[43], [45], [48], [49], [52], [53], [55], [59], [61], [62], [64], [67], [77],
[80]
Disseminating misleading/confounding
information
[22], [24], [26], [33], [34], [37], [41], [48], [53], [54], [55], [56], [58],
[77]
Suppression Contesting/suppressing public health
evidence
[17], [20],[24], [28], [30], [37], [38], [51], [52], [70]
Silencing public health opponents [24], [36]
Credibility Fronting: concealing industry links to
information/evidence
[18], [22], [23], [24], [26], [27], [30], [33], [34], [37], [39], [40], [44],
[52], [53], [55], [56], [59], [63], [64], [67], [77], [79], [82], [83]
Reputation
management
Rehabilitating industry reputation [18], [20], [21], [37], [38], [45], [77]
Discrediting public health advocates [18], [20], [21], [22], [37], [38], [49], [67]
Direct involvement and inﬂuence in
policy
Access [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [31],
[34], [36], [37], [39], [41], [43], [45], [46], [48], [52], [55], [56], [61],
[62], [64], [65], [67], [71], [79], [80], [82], [84], [85]
Incentives and threats [18], [19], [20], [23], [24], [25], [37], [44], [52], [56], [64], [82], [83],
[85]
Actor in legislative processes [18], [19], [20], [26], [31], [36], [39], [41], [43], [46], [47], [52], [56],
[64]
Actor in government decision-making [17], [18], [20], [21], [24], [30], [31], [37], [46], [47], [52], [84], [86],
[87]
Litigation Legal action to contest/obstruct legislation/
regulation
[20], [22], [27], [28], [41], [43], [44], [52], [57], [65], [83], [88], [89]
Illicit trade Facilitating/conducting smuggling [39], [45], [47], [49], [90]
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002125.t004
A Policy Dystopia Model of Political Activity
PLOSMedicine | DOI:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002125 September 20, 2016 8 / 21
predictions encapsulated in the arguments outlined above (Table 4). Coalition management rep-
resents a key outsider strategy. Themain insider strategy—“lobbying”—is not consistently defined
in the literature, being used by US scholars to refer to the provision of information to policy-mak-
ers [13] and by others as a combination of information provision and pressure techniques [75].
We use the term in the non-US sense and further suggest that actions normally subsumed under
“lobbying” can be disaggregated into the categories of information management and direct
involvement/influence (Table 4), with information management straddling both insider and out-
sider domains as we explain below. Litigation and illicit trade are both outsider strategies.
Coalition management. TTCs build and manage coalitions to provide alternative and
more credible platforms for their arguments using three techniques—constituency recruitment,
fabrication, and fragmentation. Through constituency recruitment, TTCs form alliances with
other tobacco companies, often in the form of national, regional, and international tobacco
industry associations, and recruit their staff to take action on their behalf (internal constituency
building). They also secure the support of an astonishing spectrum of social groups, from low-
income workers to company executives and welfare reformers to pharmaceutical companies, cre-
ating “simulations of enthusiasm” [23] for its case (external constituency building).
We suggest that three forms of interest relationship underpin constituency building: “com-
mon interests,” which involve actors within the tobacco supply chain, such as other TTCs,
tobacco growers, wholesalers, and distributors; “extended common interests” with other busi-
nesses whose interests can be tied—by arguments of varying degrees of validity—to tobacco
sales, e.g., restaurants, bars, hotels, grocery shops, petrol stations, and packaging companies;
and “grafted common interests” with organisations whose interests can only be linked to
tobacco consumption through non-business arguments such as freedoms or tax equity and
require strategic adoption of the organisations’ agendas. We have identified more than 50
instances of grafted common interest coalitions ranging from trade unions (opposition to
excise taxes), women’s groups (domestic violence), and organisations representing ethnic
minorities (equality and social justice) to legislative associations and diplomatic missions.
The most common recruitment mechanism is financial incentives (membership fees, con-
tributions for projects, training, etc.), although nonmonetary support (e.g., joint project work)
is also seen as important, rendering TTC support “impossible to replace with money alone”
[80]. To avoid alienating recruited organisations, the industry uses intermediaries; for example,
the US Tobacco Institute, the industry’s trade and lobbying organisation, set up a Labor Man-
agement Committee (LMC) in 1983 as a buffer between the industry and labour groups [61].
Under constituency fabrication, the industry uses preexisting legitimate and specially cre-
ated organisations as well as individuals to act as front groups. Front groups remove the indus-
try’s “fingerprints” [39] from information and evidence and allow it to fight its case without
being “provocative, confrontational and counterproductive” [27]. A special kind of front group
formation is “astroturfing” [91], in which otherwise disorganised citizens are sponsored and
organised into visible and audible blocks of “grassroots” opposition. Astroturf organisations or
fabricated constituencies can be created to oppose specific legislation or have a longer-term
mission. The tobacco industry has operated through a large number of such organisations to
further its political aims; our review has identified at least 15.
Once recruited, constituencies support the industry through lobbying (telephone calls, let-
ters, meetings), media agenda-setting (editorial and advertisement placement), testifying at leg-
islatures, and promoting self-regulation. The industry seeks to strengthen these effects by
providing constituencies with media training and materials, information, petition templates,
instructions on letter-writing, telephone numbers of politicians, and display materials.
Less commonly, the industry attempts to weaken or fragment (potentially) hostile constitu-
encies (constituency fragmentation). For example, in order to preempt women being identified
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as “victims” of smoking and lending their support to tobacco control policies, it sought to “neu-
tralize that threat” by co-opting women’s organisations into taking a neutral position to smok-
ing [80] by supporting domestic violence campaigns. The industry also seeks to weaken
tobacco control supporters through diverting and dissipating their efforts and resources, for
example, creating a “flurry of legislative activity to confound the antis” [27] or supporting bills
that the tobacco community has to fight at the same time as promoting the main proposed
legislation.
Information management. The industry takes a comprehensive approach to information
management, producing and widely disseminating favourable information and supressing and
undermining information supportive of public health policies.
Production: To construct an alternative evidence base that substantiates its case, the tobacco
industry produces information in a variety of formats (Table 5) on all aspects of proposed poli-
cies and potential (adverse) impacts, much of it inaccurate. TTCs determine much of the con-
tent and distribution of in-house and third-party produced information. Formal reports are
channelled to governments and legislatures, but much original material is processed into easy-
to-use campaign materials written in a plain and concise language of certainty. Scientific stud-
ies are often designed with in-built biases [24,48,83] to fashion findings consistent with indus-
try interests, and where there is risk of findings unfavourable to the industry, studies are not
conducted. The Tobacco Institute, for example, desisted from conducting studies on children’s
smoking perceptions, as suggested by its public relations consultants, because of doubts over
the likelihood of producing the desired results [68].
The industry also gathers intelligence by conducting surveys of public attitudes [24,27,58,
64], monitoring tobacco control activities and policies [18,27,37,52,68], and collecting informa-
tion on politicians, tobacco control activists, and opinion leaders to determine their potential
as allies or adversaries [19,20,21,37,63] in order to plan and target activities and to stymie regu-
lation early on.
Amplification: TTCs, industry trade associations, recruited organisations, and front groups
all cascade industry-favourable information and evidence to diverse audiences. Important TTC
techniques are building long-term relations with media owners, managers, and journalists so
they will “think again before publishing anti-industry propaganda” [27] and reducing the
agenda-setting power of public health advocacy through competent use of the media: strategic
timing, longer duration, higher intensity, broader coverage, and impact monitoring. Company
and allied organisation websites provide access to anti-legislation campaigns and voting sites
where fliers and handouts can be downloaded.
Table 5. Informationmanagement.
Sources/Producers of information Types/Formats of information
produced
Topics covered Audiences/Users targeted
• Tobacco companies/industry
associations
• Nontobacco companies/business
associations
• Law ﬁrms
• Accountancy ﬁrms
• Consultancy/public relations ﬁrms
•Market research organisations
• Research organisations/think tanks
• Public bodies
• Nongovernmental/citizen
organisations
• Front organisations
• Academics/universities
• Fact sheets/leaﬂets/booklets
• Reports
• Policy position papers
• Brieﬁng notes
• Books
• Polls/surveys
• Studies conducted by
consultancies
• Scientiﬁc studies conducted by
academics
• Economic/market baseline information
• Impact of policies on the economy
• Impact of policies on illicit tobacco trade
• Impact of policies on consumer
behaviour
• Legality of policies/compliance with trade
laws
• Contribution of the tobacco industry to
the economy
• Tobacco company staff
•Ministers, government
departments
• Legislators
• Recruited constituencies
•Media/public
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002125.t005
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Suppression: Public relations firms, law firms, and co-opted academics are hired to develop
and disseminate critiques of public health evidence, questioning its rigour and validity and
undermining and diminishing its impact. TTCs also attempt to suppress the publication of
public health evidence by, for example, seeking court injunctions on the grounds that the study
is “misleading and deceptive” [24], restricting access of public health groups and politicians
supportive of tobacco control measures to the media, and preventing journalists from covering
unfavourable stories [24,30].
Credibility: TTCs distance themselves from the evidence they produce and fund to
strengthen its credibility [27,60], for example, by failing to disclose funding, sponsorship, or
authorship of reports and advertisements [59,61,83] and by using professional consultants who
falsely claim independence [9,48] when delivering industry-controlled information and
evidence.
Reputation management: TTCs and industry lobbyists attempt to represent the industry as a
“good corporate citizen,” concerned about population welfare and the economy, at the same
time as attempting to undermine the reputation of the public health community, as illustrated
by a Philip Morris Long-Range Plan (1990–1992), which reported the company’s intention to
“precisely identify, monitor, isolate and contest key individuals and organizations” [37].
Direct involvement and influence in policy. Access: The tobacco industry has built, over
some decades, sophisticated routes into both legislatures and executive offices of governments,
using a large pool of professional lobbyists, co-opted politicians, and public figures to engage in
“dialogue” and to “discuss constructive solutions.” Although some of this contact occurs offi-
cially, as in the case of impact reports presented to officials, much of it is informal. In many
instances, industry executives, professional consultants, lawyers, politicians, and public officials
cohabit a small social world, and this expedites industry influence in a number of ways: multiple
conflicting roles—an academic cardiologist serving as both a tobacco industry consultant and a
scientific adviser to a country’s president [52]; a law firm simultaneously representing the tobacco
industry, a major political party, and the medical association [81]; revolving door—a legislator
becoming a Tobacco Institute lobbyist [36]; a high-ranking bureaucrat becoming a TTC presi-
dent [20]; fortuitous links—encounters at social events; a TTC distributor’s business partner who
happens to be the foreign minister [18]; a judge whose friend manages funds that include TTC
stock [68].
Incentives and threats: Financial incentives have been offered to political parties, legislators,
government ministers and officials, and candidates for political office and include contribu-
tions to political campaigns, entertainment, meals, travel, and leisure activities
[18,19,21,23,25,31,52,63,85]. Threats with potentially far-reaching economic consequences are
also used, covering disinvestment [17], withholding advertising revenue [37], taking legal
action [20,25], and making large compensation claims [20].
Actor in legislative processes: Within legislatures, the industry has used two principal tech-
niques: argument and procedural steering. Recruited legislators and third-party advocates
rehearse and amplify the industry’s arguments in their testimonies. The chief US negotiator for
the North American Free Trade Agreement, for example, was retained by two tobacco compa-
nies to tell the Canadian Commons Committee that plain packaging would be an “unlawful
expropriation” of trademark rights and lead to staggering compensation claims [20]. Industry
co-opted legislators can delay the passage of bills to the committee stage or steer proposed leg-
islation to similarly co-opted committees where they are likely to be quashed.
Actor in government decision-making: TTCs have secured representation for themselves or
their coalition partners on joint government committees and working groups established to
devise or plan implementation of new regulation—even revenue allocation to tobacco control
services. TTCs seek to take advantage of limited governance capacity, for example, in emerging
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markets to establish themselves as an indispensable source of expertise in public finance and
tax regimes. A common approach is to establish insider status with senior politicians and civil
servants and to use this to isolate and politically weaken departments charged with public
health. For example, in Uzbekistan and Western Australia, health ministers were admonished
by their (deputy) prime ministers for initiating policies on pack health warnings and advertis-
ing bans and asked to reverse their decisions following industry intervention [17,24].
Litigation. In addition to securing judgements that prevent laws from taking effect, legal
action (in domestic courts or under trade and investment agreements) and the threat thereof
help create “regulatory chill” by increasing the perceived costs of public health policies. Fur-
thermore, claims of procedural illegality, for example, in the way public ballots are initiated or
public health campaigns are funded, are used to frustrate these initiatives early on. From a
strictly legal perspective, much litigation by the industry may appear ill-considered judging by
the frequency of negative outcomes. But litigation or threat of litigation is used despite unfa-
vourable legal opinion because the strategy is one facet of the industry’s construction of an
alternative discursive reality, as illustrated in this BAT document:
“. . . even when arguments [relating to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)] are sometimes not con-
clusive in themselves, they should be used uniquely to lobby local governments in our
favour” [20].
Illicit trade. TTCs have a long history of involvement in the illicit tobacco trade [45,49,90].
Among other advantages, this enables their entry into new markets [47] and, importantly, pro-
vides “evidence” for the industry’s argument that tobacco control policies increase smuggling
[39,45]. For example, R.J. Reynolds created both an anti-smuggling front group and Northern
Brands International, which maintained the company’s smuggling networks in Canada and ulti-
mately enabled the industry to use the problem of smuggling to reverse a tax rise [90].
Discussion
Our analysis suggests that the tobacco industry’s overall approach to opposing tobacco control
policies is to construct an overarching narrative of a dysfunctional future that will ensue if the
proposed policy is implemented and to widely disseminate this narrative in order to enhance
its persuasiveness. We term this the Policy Dystopia Model. Embedded within a cost–benefit
paradigm, the central narrative asserts that the policy will undermine public welfare because its
costs will be large and will fall indiscriminately on a wide range of stakeholders, damaging the
economy and society as a whole, while its benefits will be limited, non-existent, or enjoyed by
the wrong stakeholders. This dystopian narrative is processed through three main (coalition
management, information management, direct involvement/influence in policy) and two sub-
sidiary (illicit trade, litigation) instrumental strategies (Fig 1). Within the model, there is fluid-
ity and strong interdependence within and between discursive and instrumental strategies. For
example, the strategies of information and coalition management facilitate each other: the sup-
port of a variety of constituencies allows diverse (tailored) dystopian arguments to be shaped
and disseminated, and the voicing of these arguments by constituencies render them more
credible and persuasive [91,92]. Furthermore, these diverse arguments help secure the support
of a variety of groups whose interests might not otherwise align with those of the industry. Sim-
ilarly, the strategy of facilitating or engaging in illicit trade feeds into the information strategy
by providing “evidence” for the industry’s arguments concerning smuggling and reduced
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government revenues. The model represents a highly dynamic process in which different strat-
egies are accentuated at a given time in line with prevailing political/economic contingencies.
The tobacco industry’s core premise is that policy-makers fail to consider, or underestimate,
the potentially disastrous consequences of proposed public health policies, which, translated as
costs, far outweigh any (marginal) benefits of the policy, making it unfeasible and damaging to
legislators. To impress this alternative reality on the public and decision-makers and create an
unwarranted impression of wide public and business support, it sets into motion an interlock-
ing ensemble of activities: producing inaccurate and biased information, forming (unlikely)
coalitions with diverse groups, and exerting direct influence on decision-makers.
The timeframe and geographic focus of the papers reviewed may limit the model’s applica-
bility: although 32 out of 46 of the taxation papers and all the included marketing papers were
published between 2003 and 2010, some covered historical events, and both were heavily domi-
nated by North American/European/Australasian sources. However, our previous review and
other work have shown that similar strategies are used in developed and developing economies
and repeated over time [10,11], while the sociopolitical conditions in the emerging markets
where the industry is currently establishing itself may not be that different from the historical
contexts represented in our source literature [45–47]. Furthermore, it is apparent that TTCs
are currently using the strategies and techniques we identify [5,93,94], although the weight
given to different elements may vary over time. For example, the industry appears to be shifting
the emphasis of its political strategies towards those that centre on illicit trade [68], litigation
[95], and international trade agreements [96], with the use of third parties increasing in appar-
ent response to the industry’s declining insider status [97,98]. Finally, we note that the tobacco
Fig 1. Policy Dystopia Model. Dystopian narratives (light blue box) are constructed and transmitted through instrumental strategies (purple
boxes) to achieve preferred policy outcomes (dark blue box). The three key instrumental strategies, coalition management, information
management, and direct involvement in decision-making, have recursive relations, reinforcing their effectiveness. Subsidiary strategies,
illicit trade, and litigation feed into information management by increasing credibility of messages; litigation also directly impacts policy
outcomes by stopping adoption or implementation of policies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002125.g001
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industry uses similar strategies to oppose policies and regulation in areas other than marketing
and taxation, such as smoke-free policies [11,98].
Our model and taxonomies take a critical perspective that recognises the fundamental con-
flict between corporate interests and public health. It was to address this conflict that the WHO
FCTC’s Article 5.3 [99] and its implementing guidelines [100] suggested measures aimed at
protecting public health policy-making from tobacco industry influence. A recent FCTC report
[4] shows that much progress is still needed to address this interference. Our work, by identify-
ing TTCs’ key strategies, can be used by public health advocates and policy-makers to direct
efforts to effectively implement Article 5.3; it highlights, for example, the importance of full
transparency. Second, on the basis that TTCs’ strategies and arguments are repeated over time
and place, it can potentially be used to anticipate and counter industry opposition. For exam-
ple, counterarguments and media strategies could be prepared in advance based on the details
given above. Finally, the taxonomy can enable advocates and policy-makers to recognise and
label contemporary industry strategies without using resources to investigate each incident.
Public policy formulation is a collective process, with corporations constituting only one
part of an ensemble of governmental and nongovernmental actors and institutions. Whether
corporations secure favourable policy outcomes depends not only on their actions but also on
how those promoting the policy position their case and respond to corporate strategising, and
how readily policy-makers accept corporations’ dystopian cost-based projections. Studies in
other areas [101–103] indicate that governments attach considerable emphasis to corporate
claims when contemplating health related policies. Furthermore, corporations’ emphasis on
projected costs of public health policies dovetails with the “Better Regulation” agenda that
increasingly dominates European, Australasian, and North American policy landscapes [104–
106] and is often accompanied by mandatory impact assessments of costs and benefits. Both
are expressions of prevailing neoliberal norms that posit state intervention in markets as ineffi-
cient and illiberal and promote minimal (“light-touch”) regulation of industries/business. Our
analysis suggests that this convergence between corporate and government interests and the
embedding of cost–benefit analysis within policy-making is likely to have major implications
for public health. It raises the possibility of corporate annexation of public policy where corpo-
rate interests are better represented than broader public interests and where alternative
approaches such as the precautionary principle [107] are squeezed out. A sustained public
debate is needed on whether it is ethically defensible for the values of market economics, com-
petition, and profit maximisation to guide deliberations on health- and welfare-oriented
policies.
Both our previous work [10] and the wider analysis we offer here point to the inadequacy of
exchange-based conceptualisations of corporate political activity as underpinning socially opti-
mal policy-making, an approach encapsulated in the Hillman and Hitt taxonomy [13] and
other work [108,109]. In the tobacco industry’s case, the failure of this theoretical approach
to account for the industry’s political aims and actions as well as the costs of these for policy
and public welfare have been demonstrated empirically. The industry has failed to act “respon-
sibly” [110], systematically misused and misrepresented information and scientific evidence
[69,111–113], exaggerated the costs of policies [94,114], obscured its involvement in the pro-
duction of evidence designed to favour its case [114–117], and has been extensively involved in
tobacco smuggling while opposing policies on the basis that they will increase illicit trade
[39,90,118–122].
Although further research is needed to confirm this, our model and taxonomies are likely to
be applicable to political action by nontobacco industries that also threaten the public’s health:
for example, the oil and gas, ultra-processed food/soft drinks, and alcohol industries. There is
growing evidence that nontobacco sectors use key strategies of the dystopia model in opposing
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public health policies: problem reframing and introducing “unintended” consequences [123];
exaggerating economic costs [124]; and constituency recruitment/fabrication and information
management [125,126]. Our earlier work shows that the alcohol industry, for example, uses
remarkably similar strategies to tobacco in opposing marketing policies [127]. Therefore, it is
likely that management-focused theoretical positions are equally inadequate in studying and
understanding political activity in other sectors. There is urgent need for more critical social
science scholarship in this field.
Conclusions
The Policy Dystopia Model and taxonomies can be a useful resource to the public health com-
munity and to policy-makers at national, regional, and international levels. First, this work will
enable systematic focus on the types of dystopian narratives the industry is likely to produce
for specific policies and the voices it is likely to use; these can then be preempted through effec-
tive counterarguments [128]. The health and societal benefits of the policies, in particular, need
to be foregrounded to counter industry attempts to background them. Second, the taxonomies
will enable health actors to anticipate and identify the kinds of coalitions the industry may
attempt to build. Third, our work highlights that a crucial informational task for health actors
is to deconstruct industry deconstructions of public science as well as to produce and dissemi-
nate information on the policy, paying attention to audience and language. Here, two strategies
emerge as important: involving supportive organisations and individuals in producing and cas-
cading information and enabling interdisciplinary networking by lawyers, public policy
experts, economists, and scientists [129]. Fourth, the work highlights that government must
ensure and the public health community must insist on transparency in official interactions
with the industry and lobbyist access to legislatures as well as funding disclosure for all individ-
uals and organisations acting as stakeholders. Finally, the model and taxonomies can place
public health advocates and policy-makers in an advantageous position in which they are able
to proactively plan narratives and strategies and not merely react to those of the industry. Fur-
ther empirical work is required to examine whether the policy dystopia model is applicable to
other tobacco control policy areas such as smoke-free environments as well as to nontobacco
public health policies; how public and elected officials make sense of and respond to industry
strategies; and what works in countering corporate political activity.
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